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POLITICAL PREDATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
JEAN PAUL AZAM, ROBERT BATES, AND BRUNO BIAIS
We analyze a game between citizens and governments, whose type
(benevolent or predatory) is unknown to the public. Opportunistic
governments mix between predation and restraint. As long as restraint is
observed, political expectations improve, people enter the modern sec-
tor, and the economy grows. Once there is predation, the reputation of
the government is ruined and the economy collapses. If citizens are
unable to overthrow this government, the collapse is durable. Otherwise,
a new government is drawn and the economy can rebound. Consistent
with stylized facts, equilibrium political and economic histories are
random, unstable, and exhibit long-term divergence.
1. INTRODUCTION
AS STRESSED by Rodrik (1999), ‘‘the notion that countries can be neatly
separated into high- , medium- and low-growth groups over the longer term
is an illusion . . .’’ (p. 387). His statement comes in response to the empirical
findings of Easterly et al. (1993): growth in 1960–1975, they find, was but
weakly related to growth in 1975–1989. Countries had thus experienced
dramatic changes in growth rates, while growth fundamentals had little
changed. Following up on these findings, Pritchett (2000) confirms the im-
portance of inflexions in growth paths, identifying particular periods of
growth (‘‘plateaus’’ or ‘‘plains’’) and episodes of rapid decline (‘‘moun-
tains’’). Jerzmanowski (2006) too emphasizes such dynamics and captures
them within a Markov switching model, where regime shifts cause sharp
changes in the growth process. Increasingly scholars, such as Hausmann
et al. (2006) and Rodrik (1999), explore the impact of political factors, such
as wars or regime changes, to account for changes in growth rates.
This paper proposes a theoretical model that generates sharp changes in
growth rates due to political factors. We focus on the evolution of private
agents’ expectations about how their government is likely to behave. Para-
phrasing Weingast (1995), if the government is powerful enough to create
property rights, it is also powerful enough to violate them. It is beliefs about
how the government will employ its power that count.
To capture the manner in which economies enter and persist in various
growth regimes, we develop a dynamic model in which citizens are not
perfectly informed about the type of the government and update their beliefs
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based on past observations. We assume the government could be either
benevolent or predatory. The latter type extracts rents by utilizing a well-
known range of instruments (e.g. Bates, 1981; Lal, 1983).
In developing our argument, we make use of a variant of the standard
model of a two-sector economy (e.g. Lewis, 1954). Development results from
the transfer of resources from a less productive sector, which we will call the
informal or traditional sector, to a more productive, which we call the formal
or modern. Citizens in the traditional sector are self-employed or work as
household laborers, artisans, or farmers. In the modern sector, industrial or
agricultural firms utilize new technologies and physical capital on a relatively
large scale.1 They also rely on certification and information techniques, pro-
vided by financial intermediaries and accountants that enhance their ability to
make use of sophisticated contracts (see Hicks, 1969). While modern firms are
more productive, they are also more visible and vulnerable to exactions by
politicians. In contrast, informal activities are less visible, and it is more costly
and less rewarding for the government to expropriate them (De Soto, 1989).
At each period, citizens choose whether to operate in the informal or
formal sector. Then the government, if opportunistic, decides whether or not
to predate. Thus, the government’s choice provides a signal of its type.2
While predation generates immediate benefits for the opportunistic gov-
ernment, restraint enhances political optimism, encouraging citizens to enter
the formal sector. An opportunistic government, rationally anticipating the
response of the citizens, trades off the immediate costs of restraint against
the benefits of future predation. Its strategy takes the form of mixing be-
tween predation and restraint. The a priori distribution of the government’s
type and of its policy choices determine the citizens’ assessment of political
risk and thus the growth of the economy.3
As long as the government does not predate, political optimism increases;
as resources flow to the modern sector, the economy expands. Citizens,
however, rationally anticipate predatory governments to mimic the behavior
of benevolent ones. They are not certain whether the history of restraint
reveals the presence of a benevolent government or merely reflects the efforts
of a predatory one to ‘‘fatten’’ the modern sector before engaging in pre-
dation. The resulting political risk lowers the growth rate. It also shapes the
distribution of income. Because wages in the modern sector can be ex-
propriated, they include a risk premium. Hence, there is a wedge between
the compensation promised in the modern sector and that obtained in the
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1Note, however, that our model does not explicitly rely on economies of scale, and thus differs
from the class of two-sector models running from Murphy et al. (1989a, 1989b) to Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943).
2Our analysis is in line with the reputation models of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom
and Roberts (1982).
3Thus policy risk arises endogenously, reflecting the strategies of political and economic
agents. This differs from exogenous random policy reversals or changes in the government
(Alesina and Tabellini, 1989; Rodrik, 1991).
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traditional. The risk premium, which is decreasing in the political reputation
of the government, lowers the profits of modern sector firms.
The equilibrium dynamics of the politico-economic system are char-
acterized by a Markov chain. Both the extreme states – where the type of the
current government is known – and the interior states – where the citizens
are gradually learning about the government’s type – have positive prob-
ability in the ergodic distribution. Thus, our theoretical model generates
dynamics that are in line with recent empirical findings: persistent di-
vergences ariseQ2 (Maddison, 2001), collapse can follow sustained growth
(Easterly et al., 1993; Pritchett, 2000), regime shifts follow a Markov process
(Jerzmanowski, 2006), and political events can trigger these shifts (Rodrik,
1999; Hausmann et al., 2006).4
Our paper complements the institutionalist theories of development (see
e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2004; Engerman
and Sokoloff, 1997; North and Weingast, 1989; Root, 1989). In addition to
institutions, we emphasize citizens’ beliefs and heterogeneity in government
types. Our approach is consistent with the empirical findings of Jones and
Olken (2004) that leaders’ identities matter for growth. It is also related to
Besley (1997). But, in the latter, in contrast with our analysis, there are no
informational asymmetries about the type of the government, nor does
predation on the equilibrium path. Our analysis also complements previous
analyses of asymmetric information about governments. Rodrik (1989)
shows that good governments signal their types by implementing larger re-
forms than in the first best. Perotti (1995) shows how benevolent govern-
ments breed confidence by following gradual privatization policies. Phelan
(2004) studies financial and monetary crises.5
The next section presents our model. Section 3 presents the politico-economic
histories arising in equilibrium. Section 4 presents an extension of our model
where even benevolent governments extract some resources from the private
sector. Section 5 presents empirical implications of our theoretical analysis.
Section 6 offers some concluding comments. Proofs are in Appendix A.
2. THE MODEL
2.1 Citizens and Governments
Consider a discrete time, infinite horizon model where time t goes from 1 to
infinity. The actors – each rational and risk neutral – include a unit mass
continuum of private citizens and an agent that possesses the power to en-
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4Our theoretical analysis also generates dynamics that are in line with the empirical findings of
Glaeser et al. (2004). In our equilibrium as well as in their empirical results, poor countries get
out of poverty when dictators follow good policies and along this process institutions improve.
5Our modeling framework differs from Phelan’s in particular because, unlike us, he assumes
that there are unobservable changes in government type, and because we study wages and in-
equality, while he does not.
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gage in predation. The potential predator can be the current government or
another political player who might attempt to seize power and expropriate
other people’s wealth. For simplicity, we hereafter refer to the potential
predator as the government. Before the game, nature selects the govern-
ment’s type. With probability p0, the government is relatively benevolent.
With the complementary probability (1 p0), it is opportunistic.
For simplicity we first assume that the benevolent government fully refrains
from predation, while the opportunistic government must choose between full
restraint and full predation. We later extend our analysis to consider a less
stylized model. As does Besley (1997), we assume a benevolent government
also extracts resources from the private sector and that an opportunistic
government must choose between such limited extraction and predation. We
show that our qualitative results still obtain in that setting.
2.2 The Modern Sector and the Traditional Sector
In line with Lewis (1954) and others (e.g. Harris and Todaro, 1970), we as-
sume a two-sector economy. The traditional sector is less productive than the
modern (which we also term the formal) sector of the economy. Because they
benefit from access to superior technologies and better infrastructure, firms
operating in the modern sector are more productive. Economic development
occurs as resources move from the traditional sector to the modern.
Denote by bt the fraction of agents operating in the modern sector at time
t, and by 1 bt the fraction of agents operating in the traditional sector. For
simplicity, we set output in the traditional sector to 1 bt, i.e. the marginal
product in the traditional sector is constant and normalized to one. Output
in the modern sector is Y(bt). The production function Y(.) is continuous,
increasing, and concave. Again for simplicity, we consider only one input:
labor. We assume the modern sector is more productive than the traditional
sector, i.e. Y 0ðbÞ  1; 8b[ ½0; 1. Efficiency therefore requires that all the
population work in the modern sector. To simplify the analysis we assume
that Y0(1)¼ 1, which implies that, when all agents work in the modern
sector, marginal productivity is equalized in the two sectors. As will be seen,
this assumption also implies that, with positive levels of political risk, the
optimal value of b remains strictly lower than 1.
In this context, the first-best allocation is the solution of
Maxbt [ ½0;1YðbtÞ þ ð1 btÞ. Concavity of the production function implies that
the second-order condition holds. Under our assumption that Y0(1)¼ 1, the
optimum is pinned down by the first-order condition and b¼ 1. When there is
no risk of predation, the competitive equilibrium implements this allocation.
Citizens working in the traditional sector obtain their marginal productivity
equal to 1. Those employed in the modern sector receive wage w. As long as
bo1, equilibrium requires that workers be indifferent between taking a job in
the modern sector and being self-employed in the traditional sector, implying
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that w¼ 1.6 The modern sector firms are competitive and maximize profits
YðbtÞ  btw taking wages as given. This yields the first-best allocation.
2.3 The Risk of Predation
The greater efficiency of the formal sector comes at the cost of greater political
risk. Whether because the firms are larger, less mobile, or more visible, an
opportunistic government finds it not only more lucrative but also less costly
to prey upon output from the formal sector. To capture this vulnerability in
the simplest possible way, we initially assume that, when the government
chooses to predate at time t, it endeavors to capture the output of the modern
sector: Y(bt). If it is successful, the profits of private firms are entirely
expropriated and wages in the modern sector are not paid. In contrast, we
assume that output in the traditional sector is protected from political pre-
dation. Thus, the risk of political predation can deter citizens from leaving the
safe traditional sector to enter the more productive modern sector.
At the beginning of each period, citizens make the initial move, choosing
whether to work in the traditional or modern sector. The predatory agent
then chooses whether to seize the output of the latter sector or to refrain
from predation. His strategy is described by the probability that it refrains
from predation at time t, denoted by mt. If the opportunistic government
never predates at time t, then mt¼ 1. If it always engages in predation, mt¼ 0.
The intermediary case (0o mto 1) corresponds to a mixed strategy. Figure 1
portrays the sequence of play.
While citizens are initially uncertain about the government’s type, they
rationally update their prior expectations after observing its behavior. Be-
cause their actions play the role of a signal, predatory agents possess an
incentive to pool with benevolent ones, initially refraining from predation so
as to enhance their reputation and subsequently secure a larger gain.
2.4 Political Instability
The government’s discount rate is dGo 1, which can also be interpreted as the
probability that the government remains in power. In that interpretation, with
probability 1 dG there can be an exogenous political shock, such as an
invasion or the death of the political leader and a new government takes over
at time tþ 1, with initial reputation p0.7 As far as the mathematical analysis
of the government policy is concerned, the two interpretations – one in terms of
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6This indifference condition is sufficient but not necessary when b¼ 1.
7Mozambique offers an example (see Jones and Olken, 2004). Its historical leader, Samora
Machel, was a predatory autocrat. Consistent with our theory, under his leadership Mo-
zambique had very low growth. In 1986, Samora Machel died, which can be interpreted as an
exogenous shock. Joaquin Chissano became the new national leader, which can be interpreted as
a new draw, as in our model. Consistent with our model, as this new leader refrained from
predation, the growth rate rose.
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discount rate and the other in terms of exogenous political shocks –
are equivalent.
After predation, with probability n, the government is overthrown
and a new government takes over, with initial reputation p0. In that
case the modern sector is not expropriated and wages are paid. In contrast,
when the government successfully predates and stays in power, modern
firms are expropriated and modern sector wages are not paid. To simplify
the analysis, we assume n<1=Y 0ð0Þ, which implies that when citizens
are sure that the government will predate they prefer not to enter the
modern sector.
3. EQUILIBRIUM HISTORIES
The joint evolution of predation and entry in the formal sector arises as the
equilibrium outcome of a dynamic game. At each point in time, t, the private
sector and the government choose their optimal actions: bt and mt. Denote by
pt 1 the updated probability that the government is non-predatory, given
the sequence of moves from time 1 to time t 1.
The state variable is the reputation of the government, pt 1, or equiva-
lently the number of periods during which this government has shown re-
straint. Markov perfect equilibrium requires that each agent takes optimal
actions, given its rational interpretation of past observations, summarized
by pt 1, and its rational anticipations about the optimal actions taken in the
continuation subgames (see Maskin and Tirole, 2001).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Nature draws
the type of the
potential predator 
π0
1-π0
Citizens decide
in which
sector to
work
1-βt
Benevolent
Opportunistic
Formal
sector
Informal
sector
Government
decides whether
to predate or not    
Resistance
to predation
succesfull or not
μt
1-μt
Predation
Restraint
Production is
realized and
consumption
takes place 
time
Period t
Period 1
...
Period t Period t+1
Predator
overthrown
Predator stays
in power.
t 1–ν(βt)
βt
ν(βt)
Figure 1. The Sequence of Play.
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3.1 The Dynamics of Political Risk
Denote by lt the probability that the government will show restraint at time t
given the information set of the agents in the economy:
lt ¼ pt1 þ ð1 pt1Þmt: ð1Þ
Applying Bayes’ rule, the dynamics of pt 1 as a function of mt
and the sequence of moves is readily obtained, and is given in the
next lemma.
Lemma 1. As soon as the government predates, pt 1 goes to 0. If the
government has not predated at time 1, . . ., t 1, the probability that it is
benevolent is
pt1 ¼ p0p0 þ ð1 p0Þm1 . . . mt1
:
Lemma 1 implies that, on the no-predation path, the probability that the
government is benevolent increases, i.e. the reputation of the government
improves over time. On the other hand, when the government predates, its
reputation is permanently destroyed.
3.2 Private Sector Choices
Citizens who choose to operate in the traditional sector receive their
marginal product, equal to 1. Those who choose to operate in the modern
sector at time t receive their wage wt if the government does not predate
or if, after attempting to predate, the government is overthrown. Equili-
brium in the labor market implies that citizens be indifferent between
self-employment in the informal sector and employment in the modern
sector. Hence,
wt ¼ 1lt þ ð1 ltÞn : ð2Þ
Taking the wage rate as given, the modern sector firms choose how many
workers to hire to maximize expected profits:
max
bt [ ½0;1
ðlt þ ð1 ltÞnÞðYðbtÞ  btwtÞ:
Substituting in the equilibrium wage, expected profits in the modern sector
are ðlt þ ð1 ltÞnÞYðbtÞ  bt. The solution of this program is given in the
next lemma.
Lemma 2. If lt¼ 1, then all citizens operate in the modern sector. If lt¼ 0,
then all citizens operate in the traditional sector. For interior values of lt, the
fraction of citizens employed in the traditional sector, bt, is an increasing
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function of lt denoted by B(.):
bt ¼ BðltÞ ¼ Y 01
1
lt þ ð1 ltÞn
 
: ð3Þ
As the probability that there will be no predation (lt) rises from 0 to 1, the
fraction of the population working in the formal sector (B(lt)) increases
from 0 to 1. Since the modern sector is more productive than the traditional
one, GDP per capita is increasing in lt, i.e. it is decreasing in political risk.
Note also that the sensitivity of economic development (bt) to political risk
(lt) is lower when the ability of the people to resist full predation (n) is large.
ForQ3 interior values of, the fraction of the population operating in the
formal sector is given by the first-order condition:
Y 0ðbtÞ ¼ wt ¼
1
lt þ ð1 ltÞn ;
which simply equates the marginal productivity of labor to wages in the
modern sector. The greater the political risk, the greater the wages necessary
to attract agents in the modern sector.
3.3 The Program of an Opportunistic Government
We now analyze the problem from the point of view of an opportunistic
government. Once the government has predated, its reputation is ruined;
citizens permanently exit the vulnerable modern sector and there is no fur-
ther predatory gain. Denote by Jt the value function of the opportunistic
government if it has not predated until time t. The expected utility of the
government when it engages in predation is the product of the probability
that the government will stay in power and the output it can then ex-
propriate. Denote this expected gain by jðbtÞ:
jðbtÞ ¼ ð1 nÞYðbtÞ:
Denote by Jt the value function of the opportunistic government after t
periods of restraint. It is defined by the following Bellman equation:
Jt ¼ max
mt [ ½0;1
fð1 mtÞjðbtÞ þ mtdGJtþ1g:
As long as the opportunistic government shows some restraint, i.e. as long as
mt4 0, the first-order condition states that the government is indifferent
between immediate predation and restraint.8 Thus, on the no-predation
path, Jt ¼ jðbtÞ ¼ dGJtþ1. This equality emphasizes the link between the
value function of the government and the current level of development of the
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8mt¼ 1 never arises in equilibrium. Were citizens to expect mt¼ 1, then restraint at time t, while
costly for the impatient government, would not improve its reputation.
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modern sector. Indeed, the latter determines how much the government can
obtain if it predates immediately, thus anchoring its value function.
3.4 Equilibrium
From this infinite horizon game, a finite horizon emerges endogenously.
Intuitively, as the number of periods without predation increases, the
updated probability that the government is benevolent increases. This in-
creased optimism generates an increase in the fraction of the population
operating in the formal sector. The expansion of the modern economy, in
turn, raises the attractiveness of predation for the opportunistic government.
At some point the temptation grows so large that an opportunistic gov-
ernment can no longer resist. At this point, it predates.
To make this point more formally, first define b as the level of devel-
opment of the formal sector such that the opportunistic government is in-
different between predating now and waiting, for full development at the
next period9:
b ¼ Y1ðdGYð1ÞÞ:
Second, define p as the level of the probability that the government is
benevolent, such that a fraction b of the citizens is willing to enter the
modern sector, even while anticipating that the government, if opportunistic,
would predate for sure, i.e. b¼B(p). Since B is increasing it is invertible.
Hence, we can write p as
p ¼ B1ðbÞ:
The following proposition directly stems from these definitions.
Proposition 1. When pt reaches p
, then the following is a Nash equilibrium
of the continuation game: an opportunistic government always predates
(mt¼ 0) and a fraction b of the citizens choose to enter the formal sector. If
there is no predation at time t, then the economy reaches full development at
the next period, i.e. btþs ¼ 1; 8s  1.
Denote by T the endogenous horizon of our politico-economic game. After
observing T 1 periods without predation, the probability that the govern-
ment is benevolent reaches p.10 Thus, at time T, by construction, the value
function of the government is JT ¼ dGjð1Þ. Before time T, the government
follows a mixed strategy and thus is indifferent between predation and
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
9Note that b is strictly lower than 1.
10Because we work in discrete time, we face an integer number problem: at time T 1, the
conditional probability that the government is opportunistic is strictly below p, and at time T it
is (generically) strictly above. To avoid technicalities, we neglect the integer problem, and work
as if at time T the updated probability that the government is opportunistic just reached p.
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restraint. Hence, JT1 ¼ jðbT1Þ ¼ d2Gjð1Þ. Iterating, JTk ¼ jðbTkÞ ¼
dkþ1G jð1Þ. As noted in the following lemma, this expression pins down the
value function of the opportunistic government and the fraction of the
population operating in the modern sector on the no-predation path.
Lemma 3. On the no-predation path, 8t  T , the opportunistic government
value function is
Jt ¼ dTþ1tG jð1Þ; ð4Þ
and the fraction of the population working in the modern sector is
bt ¼ j1ðdTþ1tG jð1ÞÞ: ð5Þ
The mixed strategy indifference condition implies that the value function of
the opportunistic government on the no-predation path is the present value
of its payoff at the endogenous final date T, as stated in equation (4). This
value function increases with time. The indifference condition also implies
that the fraction of the population operating in the modern sector is j1ðJtÞ.
Since jð:Þ is increasing between 0 and b, bt also increases with time on the
no-predation path.
Turning to the dynamics of political risk, equation (3) expresses the fraction
of the population operating in the modern sector in a given period as a
function of the probability that there will be no predation during that period.
Since this function is increasing, it can be inverted, which yields lt ¼ B1ðbtÞ.
Substituting the equilibrium fraction of the population employed in the
modern sector from equation (5), we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 4. After t 1 periods without predation, the citizens evaluate the
probability of no current predation as
lt ¼ B1ðj1ðdTþ1tG jð1ÞÞÞ ¼ B1ðY1ðdTþ1tG Yð1ÞÞÞ;
which is increasing in t.
Summarizing the above results, on the no-predation path the modern sector
gradually increases in size. So too does per capita income and the ability of
the civil society to resist expropriation. During this process, political risk
decreases. Our theoretical analysis thus offers an equilibrium interpretation
for the jointly endogenous evolution of the economy and the polity. But,
even with successful development, in equilibrium, as long as t<T þ 1,
predation can occur.
To complete the characterization of equilibrium strategies, we need to
determine the strategy of the opportunistic government and the citizens’
beliefs, i.e. the evolution of mt and pt 1, on the no-predation path. This can
be achieved by drawing upon the implications of Bayes rule for the dynamics
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of beliefs (Lemma 1), and combining the analysis of private sector choices
(Lemma 2) with that of the government strategy (Lemmas 3 and 4).
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium whereby after a sufficiently long
time without predation the updated probability that the government is
benevolent reaches p. On the no-predation path, the equilibrium prob-
ability that the opportunistic government refrains from predation is
mt ¼
l1 . . . lt  p0
l1 . . . lt1  p0 ¼
Pts¼1B
1ðj1ðdTþ1sG jð1ÞÞÞ  p0
Pt1s¼1B1ðj1ðdTþ1sG jð1ÞÞÞ  p0
;
8t>1 and m1 ¼
l1  p0
1 p0 ;
while the equilibrium probability that the government is benevolent is
pt1 ¼ p0l1 . . . lt1 ¼
p0
Pt1s¼1B1ðj1ðdTþ1sG jð1ÞÞÞ
; 8t>1:
Our analysis is based on the assumption that the benevolent government
never wants to predate. This is just for the sake of simplicity. In section 4, we
extend our analysis to the case where the benevolent government extracts
some resources from the private sector and demonstrate that this does not
qualitatively alter our results.
3.5 The Dynamics: Equilibrium Divergence and Unstable Growth
In equilibrium, the dynamics of the political and economic variables can be
modeled as a discrete Markov chain, with Tþ 2 states. The underlying state
variable is the number of periods without predation, or, equivalently the
updated probability that the current government is benevolent. Corre-
spondingly, we label the states by the tenure of the non-predatory govern-
ment. In state 1, it is the first period during which the government is in office,
either because the game is just starting or because the previous government
has been overthrown and a new one has just been drawn. Similarly, in state 2
the government currently in place was new last period and did not predate
then. In state 0, the government has already been observed to predate and
has not been overthrown. More precisely,
 In state 0, the government is known to be predatory. Accordingly no
citizen dares to enter the politically vulnerable modern sector. Hence,
b¼Y¼ 0.
 In state 1, the probability that the government is benevolent is p0 and
the fraction of the population working in the modern sector is
b1 ¼ Bðl1Þ.
 State t[f2; . . . ;Tg arises after the government has been observed to
show restraint during t 1 periods. In that case, the probability that
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the government is benevolent is pt 1 and the fraction of the popula-
tion working in the modern sector is bt ¼ BðltÞ.
 State Tþ 1 arises after the government has been observed to show
restraint during T periods. In that case, the government is known to be
benevolent, and full development obtains, with bTþ1 ¼ 1.
The analysis above, and in particular Proposition 2, yields the transition
probabilities that attach to each state. Interpreting dG as the probability that
there is no exogenous political shock, we obtain the following:
Once the economy reaches state 0, it is trapped there until the government
is overthrown because of an exogenous event. After such a shock (which
happens with probability 1 dG), the economy moves to state 1.
From state t[f1; . . . ;Tg, if there is an exogenous political shock, the
economy enters state 1. Otherwise, if the government shows restraint the
economy moves to state tþ 1. This transition, corresponding to gradual
economic development, occurs with probability dGlt. But if the government
is observed to predate, the economy collapses. If the predatory government
is overthrown, the economy moves to state 1, where it gets a fresh start. This
sequence of events happens with probability dGð1 ltÞn. If the predatory
government stays in power, the collapse is durable, as the economy moves to
state 0. This sequence of events happens with probability dGð1 ltÞð1 nÞ.
Once the economy reaches state Tþ 1, full development obtains. Full
development persists with probability dG. If there is an exogenous political
shock, which happens with probability 1 dG, the economy moves back
to state 1.
The dynamics of this Markov chain are illustrated in Figure 2. As the
figure illustrates, the Markov chain is irreducible, i.e. starting from any of
the states it is possible to get to any of the other states. It is also aperiodic.
Therefore it admits a unique ergodic distribution. The transition probability
matrix, which we denote by M, is
M ¼
dG 1 dG 0 0 : : 0
dGð1 l1Þð1 nÞ ð1 dGÞ þ dGð1 l1Þn dGl1 0 : : 0
: : : : : : :
dGð1 ltÞð1 nÞ ð1 dGÞ þ dGð1 ltÞn 0 : dGlt : 0
: : : : : : :
dGð1 lTÞð1 nÞ ð1 dGÞ þ dGð1 lTÞn 0 : : : dGlT
0 1 dG 0 : : : dG
0
BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
ð6Þ
The ergodic distribution is the probability vector P such thatMP¼P. It is
given in the next proposition.
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Proposition 3. In the ergodic distribution, the Tþ 2 possible states of the
economy have equal weight.
The proposition implies that most of the time (T periods out of Tþ 2), the
agents in the economy are unsure about the exact type of the government.
The government has not been observed to predate and thus some fraction
bt[ð0; b of the agents choose to operate in the modern sector. 1/(Tþ 2)
of the time, however, the government is known to be predatory, and no
one dares to enter the politically vulnerable sector. Also, 1/(Tþ 2) of the
time, the government is known to be benevolent, and the economy has
reached full development.
4. LIMITED PREDATION
In this section, we extend our model to address the case where both gov-
ernment types would like to extract resources from the citizens. The differ-
ence between the two types is one of nature rather than degree. While the
predatory government would like to extract all the resources from the citi-
zens, the more benevolent government is satisfied with a fraction y of these
resources and is willing to leave the rest to the citizens. And we retain the
assumption that the traditional informal sector escapes predation.
There are now two possible equilibria: one in which the opportunistic
government permanently pools with the more benevolent one, thus limiting
predation to y; the other where the opportunistic government only tem-
porarily pools with the benevolent one, eventually opting for total preda-
tion. While the former equilibrium is similar to that analyzed by Besley
(1997), the latter is a variant of the equilibrium we analyzed above.
Consider the first. Citizens and firms anticipate that both types of gov-
ernment will permanently tax a fraction y of Y. Were the opportunistic
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Figure 2. The Equilibrium Markov Chain.
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government to deviate from such limited predation, then all citizens would
interpret this as a signal that the government is predatory and permanently
revert to the traditional sector. As long as predation is limited, firm profits
are sufficient to pay wages. The equilibrium condition that citizens be in-
different between the two sectors implies w¼ 1. Firms choose b to maximize
ð1 yÞYðbÞ  b. The first-order condition is ð1 yÞY 0ðbÞ ¼ 1 and, since Y is
concave, the second-order condition holds. The equilibrium proportion of
citizens working in the modern sector is therefore b^ ¼ Y 01ð1 yÞ1. Given
our assumptions on Y, bo 1. While, without taxation, all citizens would
operate in the more productive modern sector, limited predation encourages
some of them to remain in the traditional sector, which is shielded from
government interference.
Now, turn to the strategy of the opportunistic government. Were it to
choose permanent limited predation, its discounted utility would be
X1
t¼0
dtGyYðb^Þ ¼
yYðb^Þ
1 dG ;
while if it chose instant total predation it would be jðb^Þ ¼ ð1 nÞYðb^Þ.
Combining the conditions obtained for the government and for the citizens
yields the following proposition.
Proposition 5. There exists an equilibrium where both government types
permanently exert limited predation, by taxing a fraction y of the modern
sector output, if and only if
y  ð1 nÞð1 dGÞ: ð7Þ
The proposition implies that a limited predation equilibrium is more likely to
exist when the ability of the people to resist full predation (n) is large. When n
is large, limited predation is attractive relative to full predation, since the
latter creates the risk of being overthrown.
But what if condition (7) does not hold? In that case the equilibrium is
similar to that analyzed in the previous section. The opportunistic govern-
ment strategically mixes between restraint (with probability mt) and preda-
tion. Along the no-predation path, citizens upgrade their expectations about
the type of the government. And, if the government is opportunistic, at some
point predation occurs. To use Olson’s terminology, when condition (7)
holds, the state is a ‘‘stationary bandit.’’ When that condition does not hold,
the opportunistic government initially mimics the ‘‘stationary bandit,’’ but
eventually turns into a ‘‘roving bandit.’’
For brevity we only sketch the formal analysis of the latter case: Bayesian
updating by the citizens is still as in Lemma 1 and wages in the modern sector
are as in section 3.2. Similarly to that section, the profit maximization con-
dition for the modern sector firms isY 0ðbtÞð1 yÞ ¼ ðlt þ ð1 ltÞnÞ1, which
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implicitly defines the function B^ð:Þ, mapping the probability of restraint, lt,
into the fraction of the citizens working in the modern sector. Also, similarly
to section 3.3, the Bellman equation for the opportunistic government is
Jt ¼ max
mt [ ½0;1
ð1 mtÞjðbtÞ þ mt½yYðbtÞ þ dGJtþ1:
Thus, along the no-predation path, we have the following indifference
condition: ð1 n yÞYðbtÞ ¼ dGJtþ1. As in the above section, one can then
characterize the endogenous horizon of this game, recursively compute the
value function of the government and close the equilibrium by solving for
the sequence of updated probabilities.
5. IMPLICATIONS
This section brings our theoretical analysis to bear upon stylized facts and
suggests implications for empirical testing.
As noted in Pritchett (2000), some countries have a steady growth path
resembling ‘‘hills.’’ In other countries, initial growth is followed by economic
decline, a path resembling ‘‘mountains.’’ In our model, ‘‘hills’’ arise in
equilibrium when there is no predation and moderate but steady growth
occurs. ‘‘Mountains’’ arise when the government eventually predates and
growth collapses. Thus our model offers a theoretical rationale as well as
additional qualifications for the pattern observed by Pritchett (2000).
Implication 1. The decline in growth rate associated with ‘‘mountains’’
should occur around the time of political predation and be large. The po-
sitive growth rates observed in the case of ‘‘hills’’ should be relatively smaller
and follow political restraint.
Consider, for example, the case of Zimbabwe. Despite having endorsed so-
cialist doctrines and overthrown the government of the prosperous European
minority, so long as Mugabe ruled with restraint, Zimbabwe’s economy grew.
But when in 2002 Mugabe’s supporters began to invade commercial farms
and his colleagues to seize commercial and financial institutions, expectations
radically altered. Investment ceased, capital and labor fled the formal econ-
omy, and Zimbabwe’s once prosperous economy collapsed.
If Zimbabwe offers an example of a ‘‘mountain,’’ Botswana stands as one
of Pritchett’s hills. At the time of independence, Botswana was poor; with a
semi-arid economy and no known mineral wealth, the export of meat and
hides underpinned its economy. While the subsequent discovery of diamond
deposits offered the opportunity for growth, it also offered opportunity for
predation. The deposits were located within the home district of the pre-
sident, Seretse Khama, but he insisted that rights to the resources be vested
in the nation. In addition, he recruited an economic team that devised
policies aimed at maximizing the intertemporal flow of revenues from the
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deposits rather than their immediate consumption. Repeatedly signaling its
role as a custodian of the wealth of the nation, Khama behaved with restraint.
Our analysis implies that such restraint should have resulted in the expansion
of the economy, and the data are consistent with such an implication.
As stated by Lucas (1988, p. 4), ‘‘within the advanced countries growth
rates tend to be stable over long periods of time’’ while among developing
countries ‘‘there are many examples of sudden, large changes in growth
rates.’’ Our model offers insights into these stylized facts as well.11
Consider the random variable taking the value 1 when predation occurs
(which happens with probability 1 lt) and 0 otherwise. Its variance,
s2t ¼ ltð1 ltÞ, is a measure of risk in our model. In the early stages of
development, as the economy grows, both lt and s2t increase on the no-
predation path. Once lt> 12, which corresponds to a more mature economy,
growth occurs while risk declines. This discussion leads to the following
testable implication of our theoretical analysis.
Implication 2. The evolution of political risk during the development path
should be humpshaped. Our model predicts that, other things equal, poli-
tical risk should be limited in poor stagnating economies, larger in devel-
oping economies, and low in developed economies.
Political risk premia: When political risk is large, employees must be pro-
mised a relatively high wage in the case where the government does not
predate and governments must promise high yields on their bonds. This
leads to our next implication.
Implication 3. Political risk generates a wedge between the wages promised in
the modern sector and the traditional or informal sector and also increases
the promised yield on government bonds. The greater the risk of predation,
the larger these premia. The longer the period without predation, the lower
these premia.
Starting withQ4 Simon Kuznets (1966), scholars have argued that inequality in-
creases at initial stages of growth and then subsequently declines. This pattern
is also implied by the logic of the model. To quantify income inequality in our
model, consider the Lorenz curve plotting the cumulative percentage of income
against the cumulative percentage of population. The Gini coefficient is the
area between the first diagonal and the Lorenz curve. In our model, this is
G ¼ 1
2
ð1 bÞbðw 1Þ
1þ bðw 1Þ ;
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11Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) offer an interesting alternative approach, where early-stage
economies are more risky because they are less diversified.
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a function that is first increasing, and then decreasing in b. Hence, along
the no-predation path, the Gini coefficient increases and then decreases,
conforming to the logic of the Kuznets’ curve. Initially all workers operate
in the traditional sector and there is no inequality. Then, as long as the
government does not predate, workers progressively move to the modern
sector where they earn larger wages. This induces an increase in inequality.
If the government does not predate, the majority of the population even-
tually moves to the modern sector and inequality decreases. And if the gov-
ernment predates, the population reverts to the traditional sector, where
inequality is low.
In a country with little political risk and an initially reputable government,
the initial rise in inequality should be limited and income inequality quickly
diminishes. With large predation risk, the initial increase in inequality is
stronger, since the political premium in wages is greater, and it takes longer
for a reduction in inequality to obtain. Thus, our model yields the following
empirical implication.
Implication 4. Countries with greater initial political risk should have more
humped Kuznets’ curves.
The ability to extract a fraction of the output via taxation reduces the
temptation for opportunistic governments to engage in full predation. In
practice, it is difficult for governments to extract resources from the private
sector and y is constrained to be small when taxation institutions are weak,
which is typical or poor countries. This leads to our next implication.
Implication 5. Weak taxation institutions enhance political risk.
In addition to the inefficiency of the fiscal system, international pressure can
constrain the ability of relatively benevolent governments to extract re-
sources from the private sector. Developed nations can curb aid or raise
tariffs when governments do not follow internationally approved ‘‘best
practices.’’ In our model this leads to a decrease in y. Of course, rich and
powerful countries can also inflict punishments when governments exert full
predation, which, in our model, increases n.
The late 20th century offers an interesting example. During the cold war,
the ability of the developed democracies to punish misbehaving rulers in the
South was limited by need for allies in the struggle against communism.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, Western democracies had less need for
allies and were therefore more willing to pressure governments in the
developing world to limit predatory practices. Based on our reasoning,
the resultant decrease in y would be politically destabilizing. The surge in
political instability associated with the end of the cold war is consistent
with this implication of our model, which we state below.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
17POLITICAL PREDATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
r 2009 The Author
Journal compilation r 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
ECPO 345(B
W
UK
 E
CP
O 
34
5.P
DF
 08
-Ja
n-0
9 1
9:5
8 2
72
30
2 B
yte
s 2
2 P
AG
ES
 n 
op
era
tor
=jn
m.
Ch
ris
tin
a)
Implication 6. International pressure to curb limited government predation
can increase political risk and jeopardize growth.
What of governments who have spoiled their reputations? Are their nations
fated to remain poor? Our model offers the following, rather pessimistic
implication:
Implication 7. When they engage in full predation, governments ruin
their reputation and are afterwards unable to recover them. In such cases,
growth will return only after major political changes, as when new regimes
assume power.
This implication of our theoretical analysis is consistent with the findings of
Haggard and Webb (1994) and Jones and Olken (2004).
6. CONCLUSION
Development, we have argued, involves the joint evolution of economic
growth and political expectations. The political and economic histories that
arise in the course of development are unstable. Predation and collapse can
follow growth, and be themselves followed by economic rebound. The major
driver of growth in this process is political restraint.
Only liberal regimes that respect property rights and do not capriciously
alter the rules of the game to their own advantage can achieve development.
But our emphasis on the role of political leaders and the formation of po-
litical expectations leads us away from the study of formal institutions and
to an appreciation of the impact of political history and culture. Indeed, our
investigation cautions against the prescription of ‘‘best practice.’’ ForQ5 we
have shown that to the extent that institutions prevent limited predation,
they may in fact encourage full-scale predation, should leaders be oppor-
tunistic. In addition, we have demonstrated that, even while commendable
on their face, formal institutions may not be effective in practice. Institutions
that perform well in North America can fail to achieve similar outcomes in
countries with different histories and expectations (see the case of Latin
America, studied by Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, and Engerman et al.,
2000). We are thus driven to a less ‘‘rule governed’’ vision of the role of
politics in economic development.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 2. bt is chosen to maximize ðlt þ ð1 ltÞnÞYðbtÞ  bt.
When lt ¼ 1, the optimum is bt ¼ 1 and when lt ¼ 0 it is bt ¼ 0. Turning to
interior values of lt first note that the derivative of the objective function
with respect to bt is ðlt þ ð1 ltÞnÞY 0ðbtÞ  1. The second-order condition
holds since the production function is concave. The constraints bt  1 and
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bt  0 are not binding. Hence, the optimum is pinned down by the first-
order condition, i.e.
Y 0ðbtÞ ¼
1
lt þ ð1 ltÞn : ðA1Þ
The right-hand side of (A1) is decreasing in lt, while its left-hand side is
independent of lt. Hence, an increase in lt implies an increase in the value of
bt for which the two curves intersect. &
Proof of Proposition 1. By definition, when pt 1 reaches p
 a fraction b of
the citizens enter the formal sector. Since they anticipate that the opportu-
nistic government always predates at this point in time, after observing no
predation at time t, the citizens rationally update pt to 1. Hence, if the op-
portunistic government waits another period before predating, his expected
utility is dGjð1Þ. Consequently, by construction of b, predating now is
optimal for the opportunistic government. &
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof proceeds in three steps:
First step: Relying on Lemma 1, (1), and Bayes’ law, we obtain mt and
pt 1 as a function of lt. The probability of restraint at time 1 is l1 ¼ p0þ
ð1 p0Þm1. This implies that m1 ¼ ðl1  p0Þð1 p0Þ1. The proof proceeds
by induction.
To prove that the property holds at time 2, we must prove that m2 ¼
ðl1l2  p0Þ=ðl1  p0Þ. The probability of restraint at time 2 is l2 ¼ p1þ
ð1 p1Þm2. Thus, m2 ¼ ðl2  p1Þð1 p1Þ1. From Lemma 1, p1 ¼ p0ðp0þ
ð1 p0Þm1Þ1. Hence,
m2 ¼
l2½p0 þ ð1 p0Þm1  p0
ð1 p0Þm1
:
Substituting l1 ¼ p0 þ ð1 p0Þm1 and ð1 p0Þm1 ¼ l1  p0, m2 ¼
ðl2l1  p0Þðl1  p0Þ1, completes the first step of the proof. Next we need to
prove that if the property holds until time t 1, then it also holds at time t. By
definition of lt, mtðlt  pt1Þð1 pt1Þ1. From Lemma 1,
1 pt1 ¼ ð1 p0Þm1 . . . mtp0 þ ð1 p0Þm1 . . . mt
:
Substituting in mt,
mt ¼
lt½p0 þ ð1 p0Þm1 . . . mt1  p0
ð1 p0Þm1 . . . mt1
:
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That the property holds for all time to t implies that
m1 . . . mt1 ¼
l1  p0
1 p0
l1l2  p0
l1  p0   
ðl1 . . . lt1Þ  p0
ðl1 . . . lt2Þ  p0
¼ ðl1 . . . lt1Þ  p0
1 p0 :
Substituting m1 . . . mt1 into mt, the result obtains. Finally turn to the
analysis of pt 1. As shown above in this proof,
m1 . . . mt1 ¼
ðl1 . . . lt1Þ  p0
1 p0 :
Substituting m1 . . . mt1 in pt 1, we get pt1 ¼ p0=ðl1 . . . lt1Þ.
Second step: Relying on the first step we prove that there exists a time T at
which pt 1 reaches p
. SinceQ6 , is increasing in t,
pt1 ¼ p0l1 . . . lt1>
p0
ðlt1Þt1
>
p0
ðlTÞt1
¼ p0ðpÞt1 :
Since p is a constant lower than 1, as t goes to infinity, p0=ððpÞt1Þ
grows unboundedly. Hence, there exists a value of t such that pt 1
reaches p.
Third step: Combining Lemma 4, which gives lt as a function of the
exogenous parameters, and the previous step of the proof, which gives mt and
pt 1 as functions of lt, we obtain the strategy of the opportunistic gov-
ernment and the beliefs of the citizens. Substituting in the value of bt from
Lemma 3, we obtain the value of lt stated in the proposition. Substituting
pt1 ¼ p0=ðl1 . . . lt1Þ in the value of lt given above, we obtain
pt1 ¼ p0l1 . . . lt1 ¼
p0
Pt1s¼1B1ðj1ðdTþ1tG jð1ÞÞÞ
:
Finally, substituting the value of lt into the value of mt given above, we
obtain
mt ¼
ðl1 . . . ltÞ  p0
ðl1 . . . lt1Þ  p0 ¼
Pts¼1B
1ðj1ðdTþ1tG jð1ÞÞÞ  p0
Pt1s¼1B1ðj1ðdTþ1tG jð1ÞÞÞ  p0
:
&
Proof of Proposition 3. The column vector P has Tþ 2 elements, denoted by
pi; i[f0; 1; . . .T þ 1g. Multiplying the first row of M by P, we obtain
p0dG þ p1ð1 dGÞ, which simplifies to p0 ¼ p1. Multiplying the second row
of M by P, we obtain
p0dGð1 l1Þð1 nÞ þ p1ðð1 dGÞ þ dGð1 l1ÞnÞ þ p2dGl1 ¼ p2:
Substituting p0¼ p1 and simplifying, we obtain p0¼ p2. Iterating, we find
that all the elements of P are equal. &
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